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BLESSED AND AWARDED ARE THE
PEACEMAKERS? AN ESSAY IN
REMEMBRANCE OF
HAROLD JACOBSON
J. David Singer*
As colleagues in the World Politics program for better than forty
years, it should come as no surprise that Harold Jacobson and I knew
one another's priorities fairly well. While we were not very close personally, we were nevertheless quite close professionally. We both
worried about and lamented the turns that world politics took in the
wake of World War II, and while he was never quite as critical as was I
in evaluating U.S. policies, we shared the same concern over the extent
to which the "superpowers" ignored or even weakened the United Nations system. We also both felt the desirability for greater scholarly and
political attention to the needs of the larger global community, embracing not only problems of war and peace and international law and
organization, but also those of human rights, sustainable development,
and the material environment. In sum, we both believed that scholars
need be as concerned with public policy and the state of the global village as with our teaching and our research.
From that concern, it was a short step to consider what we, other
scholars, and public intellectuals in general ought to be doing to make
the world a more peaceful and humane place. This certainly extended to
our joint willingness to speak with and chair student and citizen groups,
organize lay conferences, and subject ourselves to interviews with the
media. Jake was no "ivory tower" academic nor was I, and one consequence was that we cared how the larger society observed, understood,
and evaluated those of us engaged in the study and practice of global
affairs. Among the manifestations of that interest was the matter of recognition-friendly or otherwise-of those so engaged. Not surprisingly,
then, that with each year's announcement of the Nobel Peace Prize by
the Norwegian Storting, we would either bask in the warmth of our
shared pleasure, or more frequently, commiserate over the inadequacy or
worse of those worthies. I should like, thus, to offer some informed
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thoughts about that issue, and while I do not recall showing my little
essay to Jake, I'm sure that he'd be in general agreement.
Given the ambiguities of Alfred Nobel's will, and the varying interpretations assigned to it by the Norwegian Nobel Committee over the
years, it is not surprising that the Peace Prize has gone to so diverse a
range of individuals and groups, and in recognition of so staggering an
array of acts that allegedly "have conferred the greatest benefit on mankind."' And as Abrams suggests in his excellent paper on the
transformation of the prize, it probably is "all to the good that the Committee has held no one theory of peace ... ."' At the same time, it is
difficult to disagree with Albert Einstein's comment in 1935 that the list
of recipients would make "good old Nobel... turn in his grave."3
The basic theme in this paper is that while no single "theory" on the
causes of, or the remedies for, war or other acts of collective violence is
necessary, we ought to have some general notions as to: a) which social
ills the Prize is intended to ameliorate; and b) what sorts of actions are
most likely to further that objective. I proceed from the premise that: a)
the most persuasively destructive social ill of the past two centuries has
been and remains collective violence, with war the most salient; and b)
that until the legitimacy of, preparation for, and conduct of war have
been effectively challenged, all too many of humanity's afflictions will
remain irremediable. Space limitations preclude an adequate defense of
these premises, but it should be admitted that even with a systematic
marshalling of empirical evidence, logical reasoning, and ethical exhortation, they would remain mere assumptions, and controversial ones at
that.
Returning to my agreement with Einstein, it seems that the criteria
invoked and the decisions taken by the Storting Committee since 1901
have led to two undesirable outcomes. First, the prize has all too often
gone to those who have either been instrumental in the perpetuation of
international war or at least acquiescent in the recurring process. This
would include virtually all of the so-called statesmen, from Theodore
Roosevelt and Bourgeois through Kissinger and Tho to Begin and Sadat
in the first group, and the Red Cross as indicative of the second group.
At a minimum, these selections have helped perpetuate the dubious distinction between just and unjust war making, with the corollary that most
wars are wars of aggression, a most dubious set of propositions. Equally
serious, the awards, with few exceptions, cannot but have helped to per1.
The Nobel Foundation, Statutes of the Nobel Foundation § 1, available at
http://www.nobel.se/nobel/nobel-foundation/statutes.html (last modified Feb. 28, 2003).
2.
Irwin Abrams, The Transformation of the Nobel Peace Prize, 10 PEACE AND
CHANGE 1, 21 (1984).
3.
EINSTEIN ON PEACE 266 (Otto Nathan & Heinz Norden eds., 1960).
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petuate public confusion as to where We might begin to look for the origins and antecedents of war. A concerned citizen of the world,
contemplating the identity of almost every year's recipient, could be forgiven if he or she concluded that the roots of international war lie in
hunger and poverty, militaristic governments, religious differences, racial bigotry, and suppression of human rights, to name a few. To the
extent that these two interpretations are more or less reasonable, the
prize has probably done little to enhance fraternity among nations, no
less commence the long struggle to banish war from the global village.
Where does peace research fit in this line of argument? Is there anything in the rationale--or ultimate payoff-of the peace research
movement that might help to convert the prize into a more effective instrument for the abolition of war? While recognizing that this movement
is far from unified in its normative premises, theoretical predilections,
and methodological preferences, there are nonetheless certain fundamentals upon which most of its practitioners would tend to agree. The first of
these is that war arises out of a complex combination of conditions and
events, some of which occurred long before the first shot is fired and
others of which obtain in the hours and weeks just prior to the bloodletting. The second is that some classes of war arise out of dynamics that
are different from those preceding other classes of war. Third, they concur that we still have very little knowledge regarding the etiology of war.
Beyond these essentials, there is the expected range of disagreement,
on both substance and procedure. As to the former, one's theoretical and
ideological position largely determines the types of variables worth attending to. Those who suspect (fear) that governments tend to be driven
by considerations of realpolitik, will focus on military and industrial capabilities, alliance configurations, and the geopolitical implications of
weapons technology and transport. Here is the classical notion of "national interest" defined in terms of physical security, territorial integrity,
and spheres of influence.
Those who are closer to the Marxian perspective see governments as
more preoccupied with markets, raw materials, cheap labor, investment
opportunities, trade routes, and are inclined to focus on these elements in
their search for the explanation of war. Adherents of this school often,
but not always, go the next step and examine differences in domestic
economic and political systems as well as levels of industrialization in
their search for explanation, on the plausible premise that for socialist
economies such incentives would be very weak and that for underdeveloped ones, there would be insufficient capabilities.
Yet a third theoretical school would tend to downplay either the geopolitical or the economic-industrial variables and attend instead to the
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central role of professional bureaucracies driven, as they seem to be, by
their own career and agency interests and the extra-rational interplay of
these parochial interests. A fourth orientation might focus on mass culture and either the stability or the fragility of public opinion vis-A-vis the
dimensions of xenophobia, isolationism, expansion, domestic prosperity,
white man's burden, racism, and the like. A fifth example might be psycho-dynamic in its orientation, frequently with a strong interest in the
personalities of national leaders.
The literature of world politics in general, and peace research in particular, is chock full of these and additional outlooks, as well, of course,
of varying combinations. Speaking for what appears to be the dominant
perspective in the West over the three decades or so since peace research
became a discernible academic activity, replete with professional associations, journals, conferences, and curricula, I lean toward an eclectic
effort to synthesize many of these variables, most promisingly organized
around the realpolitik model.
In contrast to the wide range of theoretical perspectives, one finds
only two basic epistemologies. One, often embraced by those of a Marxian bent, finds expression in the philosophy and sociology of Mannheim,
who was so impressed with the potency of nation, class, and gender that
he dismissed an objective social science of world politics or anything
else as a psychological impossibility. 4 Surprisingly-and despite the obvious fact that all serious scientists recognize the impact of social niche
and ideology, while counting on the explicitness of our procedures and
the reproducibility of our observations to minimize (but never wholly
eliminate) such biases-one still finds adherents of this point of view.
The more vehement disciples of the two Karls have even gone so far as
argue that they have their own epistemology, which, though it rests upon
and leads to assertions that can never be empirically tested, provides the
only avenue to social, economic, and political truth.
Needless to say, those of us who believe that matters of war and
peace are too important to be left forever to the endless debate between/among arguments that are extremely subjective, idiosyncratic, and
mystical, gravitate toward a more quasi-positivistic epistemology. Few of
us would go as far as the extreme positivist A.J. Ayer, but remain in the
traditional Comtean mode, accepting the importance of the inductivedeductive mix and recognizing the limits of operationalism; hence, the
consensus around the proposition that empirical "truths" and "causal"
inferences are, at bottom, inter-subjective.

4.
5.

See, e.g., Karl Mannheim, ESSAYS ON THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (1952).
See, e.g., A.J. AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH, AND LOGIC (1936).
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It follows from these two lines of argument-the theoretical and the
methodological-that despite the need to be agnostic as to any particular
"theory" of war, the question need not remain eternally open. With the
formulation of rival models that are logically consistent and empirically
(but not necessarily historically) confirmable (or for the purists, disconfirmable), we can arrive, by a mix of incremental inductive discoveries
and bold deductive leaps, successively closer to a compellingly accurate
explanation of international war, or at least some large subset of the phenomenon.
This brings us, then, back to the task facing those who must choose
the appropriate recipients of a peace prize and, minimally, specify some
of the criteria guiding that choice. That is, they must embrace, however
tentatively, the theoretical model that seems most accurate at the moment, and most relevant to their historical period (if indeed, the
parameter-shift problem across time turns out to be acute). But to do
that, while being consistent, requires them to evaluate two other dimensions of the contending models. One and the simpler, is the quality of the
empirical and deductive evidence proffered in support of the various
models; they must become scientifically competent enough, or turn to
those who are, to go beyond either plausibility or popularity.
The other, perhaps more difficult, is to find in the model of their
choice, the role of knowledge and action. This can be complicated, but is
far from insuperable. What is needed, to put it differently, is an acceptable meta-theory, by which we mean a scheme that proposes one or
more explanations for war, that prescribes the rules, of evidence for
evaluating these putative explanations, and at the same time incorporates
explicit notions as to how individuals and groups, armed with the "best"
explanatory theory, might go about modifying those sets of conditions
and patterns of behavior that produced war in the past. Presumably, then,
the prize givers could say in good conscience that they think they understand "why" war occurs with such destructive frequency (an average of
six international ones per decade since the Battle of Waterloo), why they
believe that particular explanation, and how their recipient has acted or
might act to enhance the modification process which will reduce the
probability of war in the future.
This is, one might say, a tall order, and not one for which the Nobel
or other peace prize committees are typically trained. The peace research
community has, therefore, a double opportunity to contribute to the reduction or elimination of war. The first and most obvious is the
discovery of those conditions and events that best account for the incidence of the several-and as yet unidentified--classes of international
war. As our understanding of the etiology of war improves, we can serve
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as more knowledgeable consultants and/or critics of the practitioners,
and increasingly sensitize them to: a) the quality of the evidence in support of a given model; and b) the need to treat all single cases as
members of a class of cases, to properly recognize the class to which the
case at hand should be assigned, and finally, the adaptive policy response
to that case.
The second opportunity is less obvious, but no less important. It is to
create incentives for peace prize committees to learn more about the applicability of scientific method to the study of social conflict, to
appreciate the connection between knowledge and policy, and thus to use
the prize as an explicitly recognized instrument for the eventual abolition
of war.
Most scholars take a dim view of academic, literary, and political
prizes-and for good reason. The criteria are typically invisible and
jumbled, the judges incapable of applying them anyway, the extrarational considerations immense, and the resulting awards a source of
embarrassment for many. But peace prizes, and especially the Nobel
Peace Prize, offer an interesting challenge to the whole idea of rewarding
and/or enhancing merit in one or another sector. By attending to the evidence, and reasoning behind it, the judges could not only rehabilitate the
legitimacy of public prizes, but also strike an important blow for turning
the nations away from war.
A good place to start the process of political action that could culminate in the abolition of war would be at the point where relevant and
critical knowledge so crucial to appropriate political action will be
found: the leadership of the peace research community. Clearly, Jake
would have been quite comfortable to be included in that category, and
his research output has indeed already contributed to achieving that objective. Would that all of our research were as germane to this goal as
was his!

